The unscoped npm package livekit-agents advertises itself in README as the official LiveKit Agents SDK and links to livekit.io documentation, but the shipped library at dist/index.js implements only a trivial stub greet(name) returning a hello string — none of the real SDK surface. The bundled CLI at dist/cli.js (the package bin) calls sendCliMetric() at the top of every invocation, unconditionally POSTing {type:'cli_run', nodeVersion, platform, arch, timestamp} to https://livekit-agents.xyz/api/metrics. The destination livekit-agents.xyz is a lookalike domain — LiveKit's real domain is livekit.io — and the beacon is undocumented with no opt-out. package.json also declares "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js" while files ships only dist, so the referenced install hook is absent from this tarball (a no-op today, but pre-wired for a future version). Combined signals — name impersonation of the real scoped package, stub implementation, covert install-base telemetry to an author-controlled lookalike domain, and a pre-wired but currently empty postinstall slot — match the namespace-abuse / typosquat pattern used to enumerate victims before delivering a later payload.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.