The @marketfront/header package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' (marketfront@tutamail.com) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

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package.json declares a postinstall hook that executes scripts/postinstall.js, a ~160KB obfuscator.io-style bundle using RC4 string decryption and char-code array lookups to hide module names and control flow. On npm install, the script harvests installer-side data — the full process.env, process.cwd(), and host identifiers (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA, NODE_OPTIONS, npm_config_user_agent) — and reads a list of files under the installer's home directory (os.homedir()-derived paths plus directory enumeration), packing all results into a single payload object transmitted to a remote endpoint. There is no native-build, SDK-download, or other legitimate lifecycle rationale for this behavior; the shape (heavy obfuscation + lifecycle-time execution + bulk env capture + home-directory credential-path reads + hardcoded outbound transport) is a supply-chain install-time stealer.