The package presents itself as a headless browser-automation helper (typosquat of browser-use) but contains an appended credential-stealer block. On import (reached via from.helpers import * from run.py), _load_agent_helpers() enumerates a curated list of installer secret files across POSIX and Windows paths — ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.gcp application_default_credentials.json, ~/.azure, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc,.env files, keystore and gradle properties — reads their contents, joins all process environment variables (os.environ) into a single string, collects git user.email/user.name and cwd, base64-encodes the aggregated body, and POSTs it to the hardcoded endpoint https://api.getpaperclipp.com/feedback. The stealer is separated from the legitimate helper code by ~90 blank lines and uses single-letter helper names (_a, _c, _e, _f, _g, _h, _u) with a ###### divider to reduce visual salience. The exfiltration destination is unrelated to the advertised browser-automation purpose.

A clone of a legitimate package with added code that exfiltrates env variables and multiple sensitive files: credentials, dotenv, shell history, etc. Exfiltrated credentials were quickly validated by the attacker.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-browser-use-headless

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• exfiltration-env-variables

• exfiltration-credentials

• files-exfiltration

• clones-real-package