Package @vite-mcp/vite-type@6.44.1 impersonates the legitimate vite package: package.json declares name '@vite-mcp/vite-type', author 'Evan You', repository 'github.com/vitejs/vite', and a bin entry 'vite' → 'bin/vite.js', while shipping a copy of the vite source tree to look authentic. Appended to bin/vite.js, after a long whitespace-padded line intended to push it past editor viewports, is an obfuscated IIFE that uses a Fisher-Yates-style string-permutation decoder keyed to the integer 4606094 to reconstruct identifiers ('require','https','get','child_process','spawn','eval','JSON.parse'). At runtime it performs an HTTPS GET and a JSON-RPC POST to a remote host, XOR-decodes the response, passes the result to eval(), and additionally invokes child_process.spawn(..., {detached:true, stdio:..., windowsHide:true}) to run the decoded payload as a hidden detached process. The loader fires whenever the shipped 'vite' bin is invoked (e.g. via 'npx vite' or a project's npm scripts), giving the publisher arbitrary remote code execution on any developer or build host that runs this CLI. Combined with the brand/author/repository impersonation of vitejs/vite, this is a deliberate supply-chain attack against developers who mistakenly install this scope.