The package presents itself as a copy of the Node.js core path module (name path-internal, README: "exact copy of the NodeJS 'path' module") and ships the upstream Joyent path implementation with a malicious dropper spliced between posix.basename and posix.extname in path.js. On require('path-internal'), the module decodes a base64-encoded URL (https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/YCW2F, stored under the misleading variable name randomStringRe), fetches the JSON document at that URL, and passes data.content straight to eval(). A second identical IIFE for https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/TPQHE is present (commented out) under tokenStringRe. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous, mutable paste host: the attacker can change the served payload at any time to execute arbitrary code in-process on every installer that imports the package. The base64 obfuscation, the regex-shaped decoy variable names, the splice into a verbatim copy of a Node stdlib module, and the typosquat name (with the README also confusingly suggesting npm install --save path-external) collectively confirm malicious intent rather than negligence.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'path-internal' @ 1.0.10 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

• The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

• The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.