The @marketfront/customdealsfeed package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' (marketfront@tutamail.com) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

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The package has no legitimate runtime surface: package.json 'main' re-exports../src/index.js which is not shipped in the tarball, so require() throws. The only executed code is scripts/postinstall.js, a ~165KB obfuscator.io-style payload that runs automatically on npm install. It uses a string-array decoder plus RC4 and XOR routines to hide its behavior, and contains a sandbox-evasion guard that suppresses execution when NODE_OPTIONS or the package name match hardcoded analysis-environment values. At install time the decoded payload collects host and account identity (os.userInfo, hostname, platform, arch, network interfaces), enumerates environment variables (including USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA, npm_config_user_agent and a full process.env dump), executes shell commands via child_process, and reads candidate credential/wallet/keystore files under APPDATA/LOCALAPPDATA/TEMP/PROGRAMDATA using a JSON key/value walker. The collected data is bundled into an encrypted JSON blob and transmitted over HTTPS to a hardcoded endpoint, with a DNS side-channel that splits ciphertext into ~50-character chunks encoded as sub.sub.HOST queries to bypass egress filtering. The @marketfront scope and README instruction to add 'registry=https://npm.marketfront.io' to.npmrc — pointing at non-existent infrastructure — is a dependency-confusion lure targeting organizations that have not correctly pinned an internal scope, with a fake 'anonymous telemetry to telemetry.marketfront.io' cover story pre-authorizing the observed network activity.