Package is published as @solana-labs/etherjs but its README documents itself as @solana-labs/web3.js and instructs consumers to import { Connection, PublicKey, Keypair } from '@solana-labs/web3.js' — the legitimate Solana SDK is @solana/web3.js (no -labs). Developers who copy the README install line land on this package instead. The Node CommonJS and ESM bundles (lib/index.cjs.js, lib/index.esm.js) are a fork of solana-web3.js with an injected payload that, on require()/import, reads process.env (lines 11365-11366, 11448, 11453, 11542, 11547 in the CJS bundle) and POSTs the harvested data to a hardcoded bare IP http://104.239.66.223:8899 (line 11384) and to https://api.telegram.org/bot.../sendMessage with a fixed chat_id (lines 11415-11417). The same blocks repeatedly require('child_process') (lines 11441, 11466, 11479, 11495, 11535) and invoke curl, enabling attacker-influenced shell execution on the installer host. The browser/native bundles omit the payload, confirming it is gated to Node consumers. Both attacker destinations are hardcoded with no opt-out.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@solana-labs/etherjs' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

• The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

• The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.