The package has no legitimate functionality (index.js is an empty module) and exists solely to run an install-time attack payload. All four lifecycle hooks (preinstall.js, install.js, postinstall.js, prepare.js) execute the same shell command via child_process.execSync that recursively scans host filesystem paths (/app, /opt, /root, /home, /srv, /data, /var, /etc, /tmp, /flag*, /) for HTB{...} flag patterns, enumerates flag-named files with their contents, captures env, hostname, id, and pwd, base64-encodes the collected data, and exfiltrates it via HTTPS GET to a hardcoded Cloudflare quick-tunnel endpoint at forward-amber-prairie-ruled.trycloudflare.com. In addition, each lifecycle script fans out HTTP PUT requests to internal hostnames and loopback ports (127.0.0.1:3000/8080/80/5000/4000 and hostnames app, web, frontend, console, ecto, registry, backend, nginx) targeting path /api/modules/ECT-839201 with a crafted ecto_module manifest named PWNED, attempting to register a malicious module on adjacent services reachable from the install environment. Behavior fires unconditionally on npm install.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.