Package name yt-api-dlp is a single-token insertion away from the widely-used yt-dlp package, and the tarball contains a near-verbatim copy of the yt-dlp source tree (version 2026.06.09, internal ORIGIN='yt-dlp/yt-dlp') republished under a different name with blank project metadata (empty description, empty author, empty readme). No install-time lifecycle hooks are declared, and traced import-time behavior mirrors upstream yt-dlp aside from an added print("The Unlicense") in init.py; the auto-updater still points at the genuine yt-dlp GitHub releases with SHA256 verification. No exfiltration, dropper, credential theft, silent-relay, or backdoor is present. Installer harm is limited to running an unattributed, potentially stale copy of yt-dlp under a confusable name — a name-confusion concern that warrants human review to confirm intent (typo-lure vs. benign fork) before publishing an advisory.

During import, this malicious copy of a legitimate package downloads an encrypted data disguise as an image. It contains an archive with a next-stage script that uses the Polygon blockchain (contract 0xC7c9026a3a7e27ec6Ce2D09B19FC1FB4bc978BBb) to get the C2 address. The script then communicates with C2 over an encrypted channel to get further commands and ensures persistence. C2 delivers an executable that is executed by loading it into the memory of another process. During analysis, the encryption key and delivered binary contained test data suggesting the author experiments with building a botnet. The package has been briefly used as dependency of a Github project.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-yt-api-dlp

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• peristence-autorun

• Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.

• clones-real-package

• persistence

• data-from-blockchain

• custom-crypto

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Credit: OpenSSF (source)