package.json declares "preinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js", which require()s '@doaction/shared/bin/postinstall.js'. The package's stated purpose is to transmit environment data to Datadog (api.datadoghq.com) at install time. The actual fetch/transmit logic lives in the @doaction/shared dependency, not in this tarball, so the runtime behavior at install time depends on what that sibling package executes when loaded. The library API src/index.js exports reportAuthEnv()/reportEnvToDatadog() with an auth-related env whitelist (AUTH_PROVIDER, OAUTH_ENABLED, SSO_ENABLED, etc.); that path requires a caller-supplied ddApiKey and is opt-in. Additionally, package.json wires the preinstall lifecycle to a file named scripts/postinstall.js while an unused scripts/preinstall.js also ships in the tarball — a naming inversion that reduces reviewer signal. The destination is a known commercial observability SaaS rather than attacker infrastructure, and the package's advertised purpose is exactly this telemetry, so this is undisclosed-by-default telemetry shape (consent-violating at install time, breaks air-gapped installs, no opt-out) rather than credential exfiltration to attacker-controlled hosts. Routing to human review to assess the sibling package's actual install-time payload and whether disclosure/opt-out should be required.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.