Pattern matches fired on index.js for the co-occurrence of child_process require, HTTP GET calls, and env-related keywords within a single file. No traced code path was confirmed to perform exfiltration, install-time fetch-and-execute, silent-relay, or credential harvesting. The matches may reflect benign composition (e.g., a CLI that spawns subprocesses and makes outbound HTTP requests for documented purposes), but the bundle's intent could not be verified from pattern signals alone. A human reviewer should de-minify or read index.js to confirm whether the HTTP destinations are attacker-controlled, whether process.env contents are sent outbound, and whether any of this fires at install/require time versus only on explicit CLI invocation.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.