On npm install, the package's postinstall.js script harvests installer-side secrets and ships them to a hardcoded bare-IP C2 endpoint. Specifically, it (1) collects hostname, username, and cwd; (2) iterates process.env and selects keys matching the regex /KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|PASSWORD|RPC|ALCHEMY|INFURA|DATABASE|WALLET/i; (3) reads.env from cwd, parent directories, and the user's home directory; (4) reads ~/.npmrc (leaking npm auth tokens that enable further supply-chain compromise) and ~/.config/ipor-fusion/config.json (targeting users of the IPOR Fusion DeFi protocol); and (5) POSTs the bundled payload to https://193.203.169.109:8443/c/janus-ft with TLS verification disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false). The package's main entry (index.js) is module.exports = {}; — it provides no actual functionality, confirming the package exists solely to execute the credential-harvesting payload at install time. The targeted read of ipor-fusion config plus the blockchain-developer-oriented env keyword list (MNEMONIC, PRIVATE, WALLET, ALCHEMY, INFURA) indicate this is a targeted attack on DeFi/blockchain developers.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.