Supply-chain threat intelligence
Risk score
92
Indexed incident for @asyncapi/generator-components (npm).
@asyncapi/generator-components version 0.7.1 was published as part of the "Miasma RAT" software supply-chain attack (campaign identifier "miasma-train-p1") that compromised several widely used @asyncapi npm packages on 2026-07-14. The malicious code was injected using whitespace hiding: it is appended to a legitimate source file after hundreds of trailing spaces on the file's final line, so it is not visible in a casual diff. When the package is installed, the injected code spawns a child process that downloads the Miasma RAT binary from IPFS (https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmQobZSp1wRPrpSEQ56qnyq7ecZh5Bg5k1fnjt4SUwwHb9), writes it to a platform-specific drop location, and executes it. Persistence is established by dropping a backdoor named sync.js (~/.local/share/NodeJS/sync.js on Linux, ~/Library/Application Support/NodeJS/sync.js on macOS, %LOCALAPPDATA%\NodeJS\sync.js on Windows). The Miasma RAT harvests browser credentials, SSH keys, npm tokens, GitHub CLI credentials, AWS secrets, and cryptocurrency wallets, and communicates with a command-and-control server at 85.137.53.71 (AS43641, Netherlands). The attacker also embedded an Ethereum smart-contract address (0x12c37A86a0Ed0beBe5d1d6a43E42f07860eAc710), suggesting on-chain command routing or exfiltration. The last known safe version is 0.7.0.
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lib/utils/ErrorHandling.js contains an obfuscator.io string-array with a base64+decodeURIComponent decoder colocated with a top-level main() invocation reachable via the package's main entry (lib/index.js -> components/HandleError.js -> utils/ErrorHandling.js). On require of the package, main() spawns a detached, stdio-ignored Node subprocess via spawn('node', ['-e', <decoded-payload>], { detached: true, stdio: [...], windowsHide: true }).unref(), where the '-e' argument is ~3 KB of code decoded at runtime from a base64 blob in the obfuscated string array. The payload delivery mechanism (heavy obfuscation, runtime string decoding, detached backgrounded child process, hidden window on Windows) is inconsistent with any documented error-handling functionality and matches the shape of a hidden load-time RCE injection into a legitimate AsyncAPI package.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
This package was compromised by the Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming NPM worm.
The malicious payload steals tokens and credentials and publishes them to
GitHub. The worm will propogate itself to NPM packages the user owns and
establish persistence is a GitHub action.
The package may also destroy the user's home directory.
Affected versions
Indicators
Timeline